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COMMANDERS DIGEST

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TO SAVE AMERICAN LIVES

President Nixon Sends U.S. Troops Into Cambodia—Object: 'To Clean Out Major Enemy Sanctuaries'

President Nixon announced April 30 that U.S. combat troops were being sent into Cambodia along with South Vietnamese forces "to clean out major enemy sanctuaries." Following is the text of President Nixon's statement before a nationwide television audience:

Ten days ago, in my report to the Nation on Vietnam, I announced a decision to withdraw an additional 150,000 American troops over the next year. I said then I was making that decision despite our concern over increased enemy activity in Laos, in Cambodia, and in South Vietnam.

At that time, I warned that if I concluded that increased enemy activity in any of these areas endangered the lives of Americans remaining in Vietnam, I would not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.

Despite that warning, North Vietnam has increased its military aggression in all three areas—particularly in Cambodia.

After full consultation with the National Security Council, Ambassador (Ellsworth) Bunker, General (Creighton) Abrams and my other advisers, I have concluded that the actions of the enemy in the last 10 days clearly endanger the lives of Americans who are in Vietnam now and would constitute an unacceptable risk to those who will be there after our withdrawal of 150,000.

To protect our men who are in Vietnam and to guarantee the continued success of our withdrawal and Vietnamization programs, I have concluded the time has come for action.

Tonight, I shall describe the actions of the enemy, the actions I have ordered to deal with that situation, and the reasons for my decision.

Cambodia, a small country of seven million people, has been a neutral nation since the Geneva Agreement of 1954—an agreement signed by the Government of North Vietnam.

American policy since then has been to scrupulously respect the neutrality of the Cambodian people. We have maintained a skeleton diplomatic mission of fewer than 15 in Cambodia's capital since last August. For the previous four years —from 1965-1969—we did not have any diplomatic mission whatever. For the past five years, we have provided no military assistance and no economic assistance whatever to Cambodia.

North Vietnam, however, has not respected that neutrality.

For the past five years (as indicated on the accompanying map) North Vietnam has occupied military sanctuaries all along the Cambodian frontier with South Vietnam. Some of these extend up to 20 miles into Cambodia. They are used for hit-and-run attacks on American and South Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam.

These Communist occupied territories contain major base

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President Nixon Sends U.S. Troops Into Cambodia—Object: 'To Clean Out Major Enemy Sanctuaries'

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camps, training sites, logistics facilities, weapons and ammunition factories, air strips and prisoner of war compounds.

For five years, neither the United States nor South Vietnam moved against those enemy sanctuaries because we did not wish to violate the territory of a neutral nation. Even after the Vietnamese Communists began to expand these sanctuaries four weeks ago, we counselled patience to our South Vietnamese allies and imposed restraints on our commanders.

In contrast to our policy, the enemy in the past two weeks has stepped up his guerrilla actions and he is concentrating his main forces in the sanctuaries where they are building up to launch massive attacks on our forces and those of South Vietnam.

North Vietnam in the last two weeks has stripped away all pretense of respecting the sovereignty or neutrality of Cambodia. Thousands of their soldiers are invading the country from the sanctuaries; they are encircling the Capital of Phnom Penh. Cambodia has sent out a call to the United States and a number of other nations for assistance.

If this enemy effort succeeds, Cambodia would become a vast enemy staging area and springboard for attacks on South Vietnam along 600 miles of frontier—and a refuge where enemy troops could return from combat without fear of retaliation.

North Vietnamese men and supplies could then be poured into that country, jeopardizing not only the lives of our own men but the people of South Vietnam as well.

Confronted with this situation, we have three options.

First, we can do nothing. The ultimate result of that course of action is clear. Unless we indulge in wishful thinking, the lives of Americans remaining in Vietnam after our next withdrawal of 150,000 would be gravely threatened.

Our second option is to provide massive military assistance to Cambodia. Unfortunately, while we deeply sympathize with the plight of seven million Cambodians whose country is being invaded, massive amounts of military assistance could not be rapidly and effectively utilized by the small Cambodia Army against the immediate threat. With other nations, we shall do our best to provide the small arms and other equipment which the Cambodian Army needs and can use now for its defense. The aid we will provide will be limited to the purpose of enabling Cambodia to defend its neutrality—not for the purpose of making it an active belligerent on one side or the other.

Our third choice is to go to the heart of the trouble. That means cleaning out major North Vietnamese and Viet Cong occupied sanctuaries which serve as bases for attacks on both Cambodia and American and South Vietnam forces in South Vietnam. Some of these are as close to Saigon as Baltimore is to Washington.

This is my decision:

In cooperation with the Armed Forces of South Vietnam, attacks are being launched this week to clean out major enemy sanctuaries on the Cambodian-Vietnam border.

A major responsibility for the ground operations is being assumed by South Vietnamese forces. For example, the attacks in several areas including the Parrot's Beak are exclusively South Vietnamese ground operations under South Vietnamese command with the United States providing air and logistical support.

'A majority of the American people want to end this war rather than have it drag on interminably. The action I take tonight will serve that purpose.'

There is one area, however, where I have concluded that a combined American and South Vietnamese operation is necessary. Tonight, American and South Vietnamese units will attack the headquarters for the entire Communist military operation in South Vietnam. This key control center has been occupied by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong for five years in blatant violation of Cambodia's neutrality.

This is not an invasion of Cambodia. The areas in which these attacks will be launched are completely occupied and controlled by North Vietnamese forces. Our purpose is not to occupy the areas. Once enemy forces are driven out of these sanctuaries and their military supplies destroyed, we will withdraw.

These actions are in no way directed at the security interests of any nation. Any government that chooses to use these actions as a pretext for harming relations with the United States will be doing so on its own responsibility and at its own initiative and we will draw the appropriate conclusions.

A majority of the American people are for the withdrawal of our forces from Vietnam. The action I have taken tonight is indispensable for the continuing success of that withdrawal program.

A majority of the American people want to end this war rather than have it drag on interminably. The action I take tonight will serve that purpose.

A majority of the American people want to keep the casualties of our brave men in Vietnam at an absolute minimum. The action I take tonight is essential if we are to accomplish that goal.

We take this action not for the purpose of expanding the war into Cambodia but for the purpose of ending the war in Vietnam and winning the just peace we all desire. We have

made and will continue to make every possible effort to end this war through negotiation at the conference table rather than through more fighting on the battlefield.

Let us look at the record. We have stopped the bombing of North Vietnam. We have cut air operations by over 20 per cent. We have announced the withdrawal of over 250,000 of our troops. We have offered to withdraw all of our men if they withdraw theirs. We have offered to negotiate all issues with only one condition—that the future of South Vietnam be determined not by North Vietnam, not by the United States, but by the people of South Vietnam themselves.

Their answer has been intransigence at the conference table, belligerence in Hanoi, massive military aggression in Laos and Cambodia and stepped-up attacks in South Vietnam, designed to increase American casualties.

This attitude has become intolerable. We will not react to this threat to American lives merely by plaintive diplomatic protests. If we did, the credibility of the United States would be destroyed in every area of the world where only the power of the United States deters aggression.

Tonight, I again warn the North Vietnamese that if they continue to escalate the fighting when the United States is withdrawing its forces I shall meet my responsibility as Commander-in-Chief of our Armed Forces to take the action I consider necessary to defend the security of our American men.

'If when the chips are down the U.S. acts like a pitiful, helpless giant, the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free nations and free institutions throughout the world.'

This action put the leaders of North Vietnam on notice that we will be patient in working for peace, we will be conciliatory at the conference table, but, we will not be humiliated. We will not be defeated. We will not allow American men by the thousands to be killed by an enemy from privileged sanctuaries.

The time came long ago to end this war through peaceful negotiations. We stand ready for those negotiations. We have made major efforts, many of which must remain secret. All the offers and approaches made previously remain on the conference table whenever Hanoi is ready to negotiate seriously.

But if the enemy response to our most conciliatory offers for peaceful negotiation continues to be to increase its attacks and humiliate and defeat us we shall react accordingly.

We live in an age of anarchy both abroad and at home. We see mindless attacks on all the great institutions which have been created by free civilizations in the last 500 years. Here in the United States, great universities are being systematically destroyed. Small nations all over the world find themselves under attack from within and from without.

If when the chips are down the U.S. acts like a pitiful, helpless giant, the forces of totalitarianism and anarchy will threaten free nations and free institutions throughout the world.

It is not our power but our will and character that is being tested tonight. The question all Americans must ask and answer tonight is this: Does the richest and strongest nation in the history of the world have the character to meet a direct challenge by a group which rejects every effort to win a just peace, ignores our warning, tramples on solemn agreements, violates the neutrality of an unarmed people, and uses our prisoners as hostages?

If we failed to meet this challenge all other nations will be on notice that despite its overwhelming power the United States, when a real crisis comes, will be found wanting.

My fellow Americans: *During my campaign for the Presidency, I pledged to bring Americans home from Vietnam. They are coming home.*

I promised to end the war. I shall keep that promise.

I promised to win a just peace. I shall keep that promise.

We shall avoid a wider war. But we are also determined to put an end to this war.

In this room, Woodrow Wilson made the great decisions which led to victory in World War I. Franklin Roosevelt made the decisions which led to our victory in World War II. Dwight D. Eisenhower made decisions which ended the war in Korea and avoided war in the Middle East. John F. Kennedy, in his finest hour, made the great decision which removed Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba and the Western Hemisphere.

The decision I have announced tonight is not of the same magnitude. Between those decisions and this decision, however, there is a difference that is very fundamental. In those decisions, the American people were not assailed by counsels of doubt and defeat from some of the most widely known opinion leaders of the nation.

A Republican Senator has said that this action means my party has lost all chance of winning the November elections. Others are saying today that this move against the enemy sanctuaries will make me a one-term President. No one is more aware than I am of the political consequences of the action I have taken. It is tempting to take the easy political path: (1) To blame this war on previous Administrations and to bring all of our men home immediately regardless of the consequences; even though that would mean defeat for the United States; (2) To desert 18 million South Vietnamese people, who have put their trust in us and to expose them to the same slaughter and savagery which the leaders of North Vietnam inflicted on hundreds of thousands of North Vietnamese who chose freedom when the Communists took over North Vietnam; (3) To get peace at any price now even though I know that a peace of humiliation for the United States will lead to a bigger war or surrender later.

But I have rejected all political considerations in making this decision.

Whether my party gains in November is nothing compared to the lives of 400,000 brave Americans fighting for our country and for the cause of peace and freedom in Vietnam. Whether I may be a one-term President is insignificant com-

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KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA

The Kingdom of Cambodia, a land of rice paddies and forest-covered hills and mountains, has an area of about 67,500 square miles, approximately the size of Missouri. The central area is level, formed by the basin of the Mekong River and the great lake of Tonle Sap, and provides ideal conditions for rice cultivation. Along the border with Thailand in the north runs a prominent and nearly continuous escarpment; a central plain is bounded with Laos to the northeast and South Vietnam to the east and southeast by forested hills and mountains. The capital of Cambodia is Phnom Penh.

Cambodia's total population is estimated at about 6.7 million, with a growth rate of 2.2 per cent a year. Most of the people are ethnic Cambodians (Khmers), but there are minority groups estimated at 450,000 Chinese, 400,000 Vietnamese, 50,000 Khmer Loeu (hill tribesmen), 80,000 Cham-Malays (Moslems descended from the people of the ancient kingdom of Champa), 20,000 Thai and Lao, and 5,000 Europeans (mostly French). The Chinese community is important in trade and commerce and includes many of the pepper planters of the southwest. Three out of four Chinese are Teochiu. The Vietnamese, many of whom migrated to Cambodia during the period of French colonial rule, are merchants, artisans, and professional workers; there are also some 25,000 Vietnamese fishermen around the Tonle Sap.

Cambodia appears on the historical scene as part of the empire of Funan (c. 100-500 A.D.), which from its port of Oc-Eo on the Gulf of Thailand traded with China, India, and the Roman Mediterranean. The Khmer people, meanwhile, had been moving gradually southward down the Mekong valley; their state of Chen-la gradually ceased to be a vassal of Funan and eventually overthrew the empire in the 6th Century. A period of war, civil strife, and foreign domination followed, but the accession to the throne in 802 of the new Khmer King, Jayavarman II, marked the beginning of the magnificent Khmer empire which at its peak ruled much of modern Thailand, Laos, and Republic of Vietnam, as well as Cambodia.

Cambodian power deteriorated after the 14th Century. In the course of disastrous wars with Chams, Thais, and Vietnamese, Cambodia was reduced to approximately its present boundaries by the beginning of the 19th Century.

After World War II, negotiations were begun to achieve a greater degree of independence for Cambodia. In February 1946 the French protectorate over Cambodia was replaced by a new arrangement, and in November 1949 Cambodia signed an accord with France which brought her into the French Union as an Associated State. The United States recognized Cambodia on February 7, 1950.

The Cambodian Government asserts that it follows a foreign policy of neutrality and that it seeks to promote friendly relations with all countries on the basis of reciprocity.

The war in Vietnam, however, has imposed new strains on Cambodian policy. North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces have been increasingly open in their disregard for Cambodian neutrality, as they maintain base areas and supply lines on Cambodian territory.

Cambodian relations with the United States deteriorated in the early 1960's. In May 1965, following a serious border incident, Cambodia broke diplomatic relations with the United States. Diplomatic relations were restored July 2, 1969, by mutual agreement, and a Cambodian chargé d'affaires has returned to Washington.

The United States recognizes and respects Cambodia's sovereignty, independence, neutrality, and territorial integrity within its present frontiers. Meanwhile, the United States remains deeply concerned over Communist use of Cambodian territory bordering Vietnam to support Viet Cong and North Vietnamese aggression against South Vietnam.

The United States extended to Cambodia approximately $309.6 million in economic aid and some $83.7 million in military assistance from 1955 until the Cambodian Government terminated aid in 1963. In the earlier years of independence this aid was devoted to repairing physical damage resulting from the hostilities in Indochina, to the establishment and support of the military forces required to maintain internal security, to the stabilization of the disorganized economy, and to the expansion of some capital facilities needed to stimulate economic growth. In the last-named category, the major project was the construction of a 130-mile, all-weather highway which, by linking Phnom Penh with a new port on the Gulf of Thailand, gave Cambodia its first direct trade route to the outside world and also provided access to new lands capable of substantial economic development.

President Nixon's Announcement . . .

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pared to whether by our failure to act in this crisis the United States proves itself to be unworthy to lead the forces of freedom in this critical period. I would rather be a one-term President than to be a two-term President at the cost of seeing America become a second rate power and see this nation accept the first defeat in its proud 190-year history.

I realize that in this war there are honest and deep differences about whether we should have ever become involved in Vietnam. There are differences as to how the war should be conducted. But the decision I announce tonight transcends those differences.

For the lives of American men are involved. The opportunity for 150,000 American men to come home over the next 12 months is involved. The future of 18 million in South Vietnam and seven million people in Cambodia is involved. The possibility of winning a just peace in Vietnam and in the Pacific is at stake.

It is customary in a speech from the White House to ask support for the President of the United States. Tonight, what I ask for is more important. I ask for support of our brave men fighting tonight half-way around the world—not for territory—not for glory—but so that their younger brothers and their sons and your sons will be able to live in peace and freedom.

THAILAND
LAOS
SOUTH VIET-NAM
SOUTH CHINA SEA
GULF OF THAILAND
Ubon Ratchathani
Warin Chamrap
Surin
Sisaket
Pakse
Champasak
Attopeu
Samrong
Cheon Ksan
Khone
Virachei
Phnom Thbeng Meanchey
Phum Troun
Poipet
Sisophon
Kralanh
Siem Reap
Phum Rovieng
Thala Barivat
Stung Treng
Lomphat
Battambang
TONLE SAP
Moung
Pursat
Kompong Thom
Stung Sen
Kratie
Senmonorom
Stung Pursat
Kompong Chhnang
Mekong
Snuol
Trat
Kompong Cham
KO KUT
Khemarak Phouminville
PHNOM PENH
Prey Veng
Kompong Speu
Takhmau
Banam
Svay Rieng
KOH KONG
Sre Umbell
Takeo
BAIE DE KOMPONG SOM
KAS RONG
Sihanoukville
KAS RONG SAM LEM
Bokor
Veal Renh
Kampot
Chau Phu
Ream
Kep
Ha Tien
KAS TANG
Long Xuyen
Duong Dong
DAO PHU QUOC (Vietnam)
Rach Gia
Can Tho
HON RAI
VINH RACH GIA
Phu Vinh
ILES DE POULO DAMA
Khanh Hung
Quan Long
CON SON
MUI BAI BUNG
Tay Ninh
Chon Thanh
Song Sai Gon
Song Dong Nai
Bien Hoa
SAIGON
Go Cong
My Tho
Vung Tau
Truc Giang
Vinh Long
Song Hau Giang
CAMBODIA
International boundary
National capital
Railroad
Road
0 25 50 Miles
0 25 50 Kilometers
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
104
106
14
12
10

Information Programs Provide Knowledge Needed To Perform Mission

General William C. Westmoreland told a Thomas Jefferson Awards ceremony audience that, in effect, Information programs of all the Military Services have *one* mission: "Keep the soldier, sailor, airman, Marine or civilian employee informed—so that he can and wants to do his job better."

Speaking April 24 at the annual awards ceremony—sponsored on a rotating basis by Reader's Digest (this year's sponsor), Newsweek and Time Magazines—General Westmoreland congratulated the 10 military journalists who had been judged outstanding in their "communications" field.

Recipients were cited during a two-day symposium in Washington, D.C., for: "Outstanding achievement in promoting a fuller understanding of the missions of the U.S. Armed Forces and informing our military personnel on the events of the times, their heritage as American citizens and the vital roles they play in the defense of the Nation and preservation of peace."

Other speakers included professionals in the civilian "communications" media, civilian and military officials. "The many pro's of the news media who contribute their time and talent to these sessions have benefited the Armed Services," the general stated.

Noting that the welfare and morale of American service personnel is what Command, or Internal, Information is all about, General Westmoreland cited the Defense Department's Human Goals. He said, "It begins with a declaration of purpose that is typically American."

Following are excerpts of the opening passage of the Human Goals and General Westmoreland's speech:

"Our nation was founded on the principle that the individual has infinite dignity and worth. The Department of Defense, which exists to keep the nation secure and at peace, must always be guided by this principle. In all that we do, we must show respect for the serviceman and civilian employee as a person, recognizing his individual needs, aspirations and capabilities."

Certainly an Information program must be counted as a major contributor in satisfying those needs and aspirations, and in developing those capabilities.

I recognize that there may be differences in the way the Army, Navy and Air Force operate their Command—or Internal—Information programs. But there is no difference in what we want to accomplish with them. They are, in effect, *one* program: Keep the soldier, sailor, airman, Marine or civilian employee informed—so that he can and wants to do his job *better*.

No military establishment in existence has the capacity to do this better than ours. None has provided so much in the way of support and incentive down the whole chain of command to insure that our men and women in all ranks have the knowledge they need to understand and perform their mission.

We have, for example, in Europe, a chain of bookstores that brings a five cent newspaper, *Stars and Stripes*, and hundreds of publications to servicemen from Norway to North Africa and from Great Britain to Turkey. There is another *Stars and Stripes* in the Pacific whose best customers are military

GENERAL WESTMORELAND

personnel in Vietnam. We have radio and television networks and individual stations bringing information and entertainment to American troops wherever they are stationed—and even to ships at sea. We have magazines and unit newspapers too numerous to mention. We have basic speeches, training aids, instructional materials. We use every form of communication from word of mouth to satellite, every device from a somber editorial message to a cheesecake photograph. If every commander were to make full and constant use of all the tools provided, we would have the most overinformed body of troops imaginable.

You and I know that this has not come about—nor will it. The art or science of communication—whichever you want to call it—offers no guarantee of predictable results. Public opinion polls notwithstanding, it is difficult to measure with accuracy the impact of an idea that has passed through the communications mill. About all we can say with certainty is that it's a long, hard road from an idea to a motivated person. Yet, imperfect as the art or science of communications may be, it becomes increasingly important within the military that the word be passed from one to another, so that all of us may understand and appreciate what is going on and what needs to be done.

Command Information tends to be a personal thing. In its elemental form, it is "just plain talk" from one person to another and the researchers have said there is no more effec-

tive means of discourse. However, before there can be meaningful dialogue, the man with a message must know a great deal about the person he is talking with. Individuals and audiences differ, as you know, and a great deal of attention must be paid to that difference. Yet, sometimes I feel that—within the military—there is a tendency to assume that a man wearing a uniform will react positively to whatever a superior tells him. This is a basic error which frequently negates an otherwise effective Command Information effort.

There is much talk these days about a communications gap between one generation and another—a gap which surely exists between those of us who have been part of the military establishment for two decades or more, and the young men who are just entering it from civilian life. In the Army, there is the additional consideration that many join involuntarily.

If these young people are to be motivated toward productive effort, any communications gap must be quickly bridged. Yet, how well do we know the people we try to reach through a Command Information Hour, a unit newspaper, a radio or television broadcast?

Some facts are evident. If we are talking about a typical Infantry unit, we know that most of the soldiers are young. We know that a high percentage were inducted into the Service. Not very long ago they were struggling through basic training. They made it and now they're part of the team.

Other facts are not so evident—the educational qualifications of our young soldiers, for example. Some are too prone to typify our private soldiers as "Beetle Baileys," which is an injustice. Beetle Bailey began as a caricature intended only for amusement, but caricatures sometimes assume an air of reality. The Beetle Baileys, Steve Canyons and Commander McHales become uncomfortably well known over a period of time. Well, the Army has been too long in losing its identification with Beetle Bailey—which it never deserved in the first place. Beetle Bailey is dead and here are some facts to prove it.

Nearly nine per cent of Army enlisted personnel now have college degrees. For the last two years, about 10 per cent of our new enlisted men have been college graduates. Thirty per cent of our enlisted strength have had some college training and 80 per cent have completed high school. The average number of school grades completed is 11.8.

Moreover, when we examine the manpower pool from which our young men are drawn, we find that 45 per cent qualified by age never enter the pool at all. The majority of this 45 per cent are turned down for medical or other reasons.

We know through exhaustive examination that more than half of the men entering the Army are above average in capacity to learn. And we find that 97 per cent of those enlisted or inducted successfully complete basic training.

And 98 per cent of the men joining units get good to excellent efficiency ratings.

COMMANDERS DIGEST

THIS PUBLICATION CONTAINS OFFICIAL INFORMATION, NEWS AND POLICY, DIRECT FROM WASHINGTON AUTHORIZED SOURCES.

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If these statistics hold for some Infantry units we checked rather closely, surely they will prove out for other units and services. You must agree that we have to abandon consideration of any comic-book mentality in planning a Command Information program to attract the attention of the modern serviceman and, second, to impress him.

There used to be a school of discipline in the Army which insisted on blind obedience. The watchword was, "Do what you're told and don't think about it!" If any trace of this attitude remains, it should be dispelled. Even from the beginning of our Armed Forces, the American serviceman has typically wanted to know why. When Baron von Steuben came here from Germany to help our young nation fight its Revolutionary War, he observed in a letter to a colleague in the Prussian Army, "You say to your soldiers, 'do this' and he does it. Here, I am obliged to say to our soldiers, 'this is *why* you should do this' and then he does it."

"The American military establishment is a mirror of America itself, reflecting what is good and what is bad. Americans do not cease being typical when they don a uniform."

As in any other military establishment, we strive for disciplined, unquestioning obedience to lawful commands. However, our military force springs from a free society where unquestioning obedience is not the same as *uncomprehending* obedience. The latter is neither attainable nor desirable.

The modern young man learns rapidly—he will respond to authority—but he insists on knowing why, just as his forebears did. We have to tell him why, or we won't get much of a performance out of him. Command Information has to put a lot of emphasis on the "Why."

But that's not all. Even more important is the "What"—the subject matter—offered through the Command Information program.

Today we find certain things which were considered *avant-garde* or even wicked a year or so ago are now judged as contemporary and acceptable. No longer is it possible to dismiss or avoid the controversial—we must meet it head-on.

We must recognize that there is no cleavage between our military establishment and the American society from which it is drawn. In point of fact, the American military establishment is a mirror of America itself, reflecting what is good and what is bad. Americans do not cease being typical when they don a uniform.

It follows then that we must prepare the kind of information a young American needs—and present it in such a way that he will absorb it and react to it. Lately we have been looking very closely at material prepared for distribution through the Command Information program.

We see fact sheets which do not relate to large numbers of

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Information Programs Provide Knowledge Needed To Perform Mission

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servicemen and their families. Some commanders do not address controversial subjects—because they are not aware of the issues affecting modern youth, or because they don't want to be involved personally.

Few commanders or their Information Officers want to speak out on such current issues as race relations, drugs, dissent in the military, health hazards in smoking, manpower phasedowns—yet these are precisely the subjects young Americans in the Service discuss among themselves. They are precisely the subjects about which servicemen deserve current and authoritative information.

How many troops are "turned on" when confronted with instruction on such topics as "Assignment of Enlisted Women in the Army Attache System," "United Nations Day," "Saudi Arabia," "the Secretary of Defense's Message for Veterans Day," *my* message on Veterans Day. This sort of information has its place, but let's not overrate its impact. The Information Officer who produces innocuous fact sheets in quantity such as these is deluding himself if he believes he is doing his job well. Troops may constitute a captive audience, but they are not an audience at all when they do not listen.

In the preparation of Command Information material, there must be this overriding consideration: Does the serviceman *want* this information—does he *need* it?

We hope we have a new look going in Command Information at Department of the Army. The Chief of Information keeps in constant touch with the field to find out what troops are talking about and where their needs and interests lie. Brainstorming sessions are held periodically to develop meaningful and contemporary topics. As a result, we hope to draw abreast of the times with material discussing:

—*The All-Volunteer Army. This subject is bound to have great impact on anyone interested in the Army as a career—or on anyone in the Reserve, which will be greatly affected by an All-Volunteer force.*

—*Personnel cutbacks—always of interest to servicemen, their families and to the Army's civilian workers—and a subject of paramount concern in these days of austere budgets.*

—*Revised promotion scoring forms. What's more important to a man than promotion?*

—*Underground newspapers.*

—*The use and abuse of drugs.*

Not all these subjects are controversial but they all are timely. Local commanders must add those subjects which are peculiar to their units, but which may have little if any relation to other organizations. An air base support unit leaving Wheelus Air Base (Libya) faces an entirely different set of circumstances than an aircraft carrier in the South China Sea or an armored cavalry unit guarding the border between East and West Germany. Each requires its own distinctive Command Information program.

This need to tailor Command Information programs to individual units, no matter how small, has always been of great concern to me. Department of the Army Command Information material may be all right, but I would support any commander who ignores it in favor of something he needs to help him solve a pressing local problem.

I am convinced that no commander can delegate his Command Information responsibility to anyone—even to his Information Officer. As a Division Commander I was also the Division Command Information Officer, and everyone in the division knew it. It was a pleasure to see how many unit commanders took to planning and executing their own Command Information programs.

Command Information is not a panacea for all command ills. But it is a useful tool which commanders at any level can use to help solve command problems and extend command knowledge to every person in the unit. The only limiting factor is ingenuity and I am happy to note such developments as:

—The Air Force "Now Series" of short films beamed at the airman under 25, and the Military Airlift Command Newsletter which permits aircrewmen to air their complaints.

—In the Navy, color TV on the Kitty Hawk.

—In the Army, Project Partnership in its third year of cementing relations between the American soldier in Germany and his German counterpart. Also, the Drug Information Center being tried by the 4th Armored Division in Germany.

These examples indicate that Command Information is drawing abreast of the times. The awards to be presented tonight add further evidence that there is talent and ingenuity in the Command Information programs of all Services.

The fact that we hold the Thomas Jefferson Symposium is testimony to the importance we place on the work you do. It is customary to say at a time like this that your work was never as important as it is now. At the risk of being trite, I say it again—"your work was never as important as it is now." The world is full of people trying to capture each other's mind. Servicemen are a prime target of those who would destroy the American way of life. With that thought as an incentive, I challenge you to keep up the good work—we need it as never before.

New York Changes Primary To June 23

New York has changed its primary election date to June 23, instead of June 16 as originally announced.

Eligible voters must cast their ballots in person, however, as New York prohibits absentee voting in primary elections.

Armed Forces members and their spouses, parents, and children with them, if qualified voters and residents of the same election district, may vote in the Nov. 3 general election by absentee military ballot.

This ballot may be obtained by mailing a completed Federal Post Card Application (FPCA) to reach election officials at any time before Oct. 22, 1970. Applications should be addressed to: Division for Servicemen's Voting, Office of the Secretary of State, 162 Washington Avenue, Albany, N.Y. 12225.

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